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“Eat it again for the first time”: Identity in a world of change 
Our everyday experience is well acquainted with the reality of 
constancy (identity) and change. Persistence over time – continuity – 
is normally accompanied by an awareness of change – discontinuity. 
Although the temptation is immediately to enter into logical-
mathematical problems, this article wants to highlight first of all the 
underlying ontological issues and distinctions required to gain a better 
understanding of the familiar term “identity”. In order to achieve this 
goal the idea of identity is related to the nature of an entity and its 
properties. Plato’s account of identity and change paved the way for 
an enduring philosophical wrestling with this problem. A static logic of 
identity may rule out change (Von Kibèd), but on the basis of Galileo 
and Einstein the original insight of Plato, namely that change can only 
be established on the basis of constancy, acquires a new natural 
scientific meaning. Acknowledging the more-than-functional and multi-
functional nature of the identity of an entity helps to avoid any attempt 
that wants to explain the nature of entities exhaustively in terms of one 
aspect only. It also supports the distinction between conceptual 
knowledge and concept-transcending knowledge. In the final analysis 
the human awareness of the identity of entities amidst change 
explores the foundational interconnectedness between the kinematic 
and the physical aspects in the context of concept-transcending 
knowledge. 
Opsomming 
“Eet dit opnuut vir die eerste keer”: identiteit in ’n wêreld van verandering 
Ons alledaagse lewenservaring is bekend met die realiteit van 
konstansie (identiteit) en verandering. Voortbestaan deur die loop van 
die tyd – kontinuïteit – is normaalweg vergesel deur ’n besef van ver-
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andering – diskontinuïteit. Alhoewel die versoeking bestaan om 
onmiddellik aandag te skenk aan logiese wiskundige probleme, wil 
hierdie artikel eers die onderliggende ontologiese kwessies belig deur 
aandag te gee aan die onderskeidings wat nodig is om ’n beter insig in 
die aard van die bekende term “identiteit” te gee. Met die oog op 
hierdie doel word die idée van identiteit in verband gebring met die 
aard van ’n entiteit en die eienskappe daarvan. Die weergawe wat 
Plato van identiteit en verandering gegee het, het die weg gebaan vir 
’n voortgaande wysgerige worsteling met hierdie problem. ’n Statiese 
logika van identiteit mag verandering ter syde stel (Von Kibèd), maar 
gebaseer op die denke van Galileo en Einstein het Plato se insig, 
naamlik dat verandering slegs vasgestel kan word op die basis van 
konstansie, ’n nuwe natuurwetenskaplike betekenis aan konstansie 
verbind. Die erkenning van die meer-as-funksionele en multi-
funksionele aard van die identiteit van ’n entiteit help om te voorkom 
dat die aard van entiteite bloot in terme van een aspek verduidelik 
word. Dit ondersteun ook die onderskeiding tussen begripskennis en 
begripstransenderende kennis. In die laatste instansie ontgin die 
mens se besef van die identiteit van entiteite te midde van 
verandering die funderende samehang tussen die kinematiese en die 
fisiese aspekte in die konteks van begripstransenderende kennis. 
1. First orientation 
The well-known slogan from Kellogg’s captured in the title is 
remarkable in two respects: firstly it highlights the apparently 
dialectical tension present in the human experience of alteration and 
continuation, dynamics and persistence; and secondly it captures 
something about ubiquity and contingency, as well as universality 
and individuality. 
Although the phrase “eat it again” also incorporates an awareness of 
succession and continuity, the tail-end of the original phrase jumps 
to something new, discontinuous to whatever has been experienced 
before, “for the first time.” A first interpretation may suggest that 
literally speaking we are indeed every time eating the same thing, 
namely Kellogg’s, and that every time we eat the same thing 
(identity, continuity) it tastes as good as new, as if we are eating it 
for the first time (non-identity, discontinuity). 
It seems therefore as if the advertisement introduces a gap or even 
stronger, a dialectical tension, between its first part and the second 
part. What is granted in the first part, namely that we are 
successively eating the same thing, is denied in the second part. 
This affirms that what we eat is something we have not eaten 
before, i.e., we are eating it for the first time. 
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Affirmation and denial are well-known within the domain of logic. 
They relate to statements (propositions) and to the applicability of 
the two most basic principles governing logical reasoning, namely 
the principle of identity (principium identitatis) and the principle of 
non-contradiction (principium contradictionis). Quine explains: 
The peculiarity of statements which sets them apart from other 
linguistic forms is that they admit of truth and falsity, and may 
hence be significantly affirmed and denied. To deny a statement is 
to affirm another statement, known as the negation or 
contradictory of the first (Quine, 1958b:1). 
Yet, when it comes to the issue of identity, language does not 
resolve the issue, partially because lingual units are not mere copies 
of what is given within reality. Quine says: “The utility of language 
lies partly in its very failure to copy reality in any one-thing-one-
name fashion. The notion of identity is then needed to take up the 
slack” (Quine, 1958b:208). However, he does qualify this statement 
by pointing out that what are identical are the real extra-linguistic 
entities: “… and not the names with one another; the names stand in 
the statement of identity, but it is the named objects that are 
identified” (Quine, 1958b:208). 
This view is defended, because Quine earlier already insisted that it 
is incorrect to assert that the laws of logic hold purely by virtue of 
language and to say that they are therefore analytic in character.1
Quine did realise that the attempt to define analyticity2 in terms of 
meaning runs into a circularity, since meaning is defined in terms of 
analyticity – causing Fodor to underscore that there is no meaning-
independent way of characterising either analyticity or meaning 
(Fodor, 1977:43). 
Once language as horizon is introduced, one may claim that human 
beings do not have an extra-lingual access to (identical) entities. Is 
                                          
1 “Carnap maintained, and Frege before him, that the laws of logic held by virtue 
purely of language: by virtue of the meanings of the logical words. In a word, 
they are analytic. I have protested more than once that no empirical meaning 
has been given to the notion of meaning, nor, consequently, to this linguistic 
theory of logic” (Quine, 1973:78). On the next page, however, he does open the 
door for analyticity, but within a perspective that hinges on “social uniformity” – 
“a sentence is analytic if everybody learns that it is true by learning its words” 
(Quine, 1973:79). 
2 A sentence is supposed to be analytically true if it is true only on the basis of its 
meaning. 
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this not intended by Derrida when he states: “There is nothing 
outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n’y a pas de hors-text]” 
(Derrida, 1976:158)? 
2. Identity, entity and property 
Suppose we look at Frege’s well-known example of the “evening 
star” and the “morning star.” Frege used this example in order to 
distinguish between “Sinn” and “Bedeutung” (connotation and 
denotation). Although there are two different lingual signs involved, 
their reference (denotation) is the same. Van Woudenberg proposes 
to speak about an identity relation in cases similar to the “evening 
star” and the “morning star,” and about the relation between entity 
and property when assertions like “the hat is white” are at stake 
(Van Woudenberg, 2000:12). 
Hart makes the situation slightly more complex when he opens his 
work on our understanding of the world with the following 
explanation – an explanation focusing on the things we can 
experience, the properties (attributes) we can discern and the 
relations existing between these entities: 
Our universe, the empirical world of time and space, is populated 
by little girls, white-tailed deer, yellow slippers, planets and many 
other things. We can attribute what may be called qualities, or 
functions, or properties to all of these entities in our world and we 
can say that they relate to each other. Little girls are cute and have 
mothers. White-tailed deer are fast and eat leaves. Yellow lady 
slippers have brown spots on their petals and need light. Planets 
move around the sun. We can record countless situations that 
always have these three elements: things with attributes in 
relation. Little girls feeling warm as they are cuddled by their 
mothers. White-tailed deer standing motionless as they listen to a 
sound. Yellow lady slippers hanging low as they bend under the 
weight of unexpectedly late snow (Hart, 1984:1). 
These remarks are all dependent on the implicit assumption that 
entities endure over time. The Dutch language expresses this 
phenomenon by referring to “het zich zijn en zich blijven” of entities.3 
However, already early Greek philosophy challenged this 
assumption when Heraclitus argued that everything is taken up in 
                                          
3 Transliterated: “the being and on-going existence of something”. 
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constant flux (Diels & Kranz, 1959/1960: B Fr. 90).4 It was Cratylus, 
a younger contemporary of Socrates and associate teacher of Plato, 
who caused the latter to come to the one-sided view of the ideas 
found in the thought of Heraclitus. Cratylus interpreted Heraclitus to 
say that all perceptible things are in a process of change and that 
they are therefore unknowable. In his dialogue with the name 
Cratylus, Plato portrays Cratylus as claiming that since we cannot 
say “what is not” we are also unable to say what is false. Cratylus 
took change in such a radical sense that he even questioned 
references to what is the “same” – such as found in the alleged 
statement of Heraclitus that one cannot step into the same river 
twice: one cannot step into the same river even once (see Freeman, 
1949:285). Apparently the implication of this radicalised position 
regarding change is that since there is never something to hold on 
to, identity is impossible as well. 
3. Plato on identity and change 
Behind this consequence we find the school of Parmenides denying 
multiplicity in its fundamental identification of thought and being.5 
Thought can only think what is, because it cannot contemplate what 
does not exist. Veling remarks that Parmenides inspired later 
thinkers to engage in a rational search for “true reality” amidst all 
that is changeful (Veling, 2000:29). 
With an appeal to the logical principle of identity, Von Kibèd argues 
as follows against the (logical) “impossibility” of change. The 
continued existence of an entity over time is derived from an appeal 
to the (logical) law of identity: 
The principle of identity, according to which everything is only 
identical to itself, actually forbids every change, every becoming-
different, every stepping-outside of a substance from its being-
itself (Von Kibèd, 1979:59). 
Von Kibèd is well aware of the fact the some thinkers (like Aristotle) 
employ the distinction between essence and appearance to account 
both for the identity and the change of an entity: 
                                          
4 In connection with the nature of thermodynamically open systems, we shall 
return to this Heraclitean idea of flux below. 
5 Zeno’s arguments against multiplicity and movement (Achilles and the Tortoise, 
the flying arrow, and so on), simply explore the basic position taken by 
Parmenides in his claim that thought and being are the same. 
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The difficulties accompanying the concept of the changes of an 
unchangeable thing are side-stepped by dividing the entity into an 
essential and accidental part, thus producing the possibility to 
associate unchangeability with its essence and changeability with 
what is accidental (Von Kibèd, 1979:60). 
However, according to Von Kibèd, this won’t help us, because also 
the accidental features of an entity are subject to the law of identity: 
“according to the principle of identity also the accidental must remain 
identical to itself and cannot abolish its essence, which is given in its 
accidental nature” (Von Kibèd, 1979:60). His conclusion is therefore 
to be expected: “The concept of change is therefore logically 
unthinkable” (Von Kibèd, 1979:60). What is needed in order to 
account for change, namely “the concept of causality, is logically 
seen non-transparent and shows the limits of logical explanation” 
(Von Kibèd, 1979:60-61). In order to transcend this apparent 
impasse, we have to go back to Plato who found himself confronted 
with a thought climate, assuming that change belongs to the world of 
the senses. This caused Plato to struggle with distinctions untilised 
in his attempt to account for the possibility of knowledge. Plato 
realised that knowledge depend upon something more basic than 
change. From Heraclitus he had learned that all things accessible to 
sensory perception are in an ever-fluctuating state. It is therefore 
impossible to know these things. However, this conclusion rests on 
the presupposition that the existence of everything is exhausted by 
its state of change. Yet, if this is true, knowledge will be cancelled. 
The moment a claim of knowledge is made, it is uprooted because 
what is assumed to be known, will change the next moment. It will 
become something not yet known, in fact, it will change into 
something unknowable! 
In order to secure the possibility of knowledge, Plato then postulated 
the enduring essential being of things (their static eidos) – which is 
supposed not to be subject to change (Plato, 1963: Cratylus, 439c-
440a). Without an awareness of endurance (persistence) the very 
notion of change becomes problematic, for the difficult question then 
is: “what” changes? For example, an ageing person can only claim 
to be ageing because there is a constant referrence to the same 
person! One can detect changes only on the basis of constancy – 
this is the valuable insight of Plato’s theory of ideas. While we may 
distance ourselves from the speculative (metaphysical) construction 
of transcendent ideal forms (static essences), we all still have to 
account for the brilliant insight that change rests on constancy. 
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4. Galileo and Einstein 
Since the development of Galileo’s mechanics, classical physics 
attempted to understand all bodies in terms of the denominator of 
mechanical movement. The law of inertia assumes the constancy of 
motion if no physical forces interact with this movement. From 
Newton up to the beginning of the 20th century, this mechanistic 
tendency characterised the main development of modern physics. 
Max Plank characterised this mechanistic orientation as follows in 
1910: 
The conception of nature that rendered the most significant service 
to physics up till the present is undoubtedly the mechanical. If we 
consider that this standpoint proceeds from the assumption that all 
qualitative differences are ultimately explicable by motions, then 
we may well define the mechanistic conception as the conviction 
that all physical processes could be reduced completely to the 
motions (italics – DFMS) of unchangeable, similar mass-points or 
mass-elements (Planck, 1973:53). 
In kinematics all processes are reversible in principle. This 
reversibility concerns the kinematical time order of uniformity 
(constancy).6 As such it lies at the foundation of the dynamic 
changes discernable within physical processes of energy 
transformation. Already in 1824 Carnot discovered fundamentally 
irreversible physical processes. During the 19th century the 
implication of this discovery was further explored by Clausius and 
Thompson in their formulation of the second main law of 
thermodynamics. In 1865 Clausius introduced the term entropy. This 
law accounts for the irreversibility of physical processes, since it 
determines the direction of a physical (or chemical) process in a 
closed system. 
Thus, the law of non-decreasing entropy was established as the 
second main law of thermodynamics. At the same time, the classical 
mechanistic reduction to pure motion was uprooted. Justifiably, 
therefore, Max Planck (in his mentioned article from 1910) remarks 
that the “irreversibility of natural processes” confronted the 
“mechanistic conception of nature” with “insurmountable problems” 
                                          
6 This reversibility is analogous to numerical succession and spatial co-existence 
– which are both also reversible. The reversibility of the numerical time order 
first of all flows from the reversibility of the + and – directions in the system of 
integers. Although concrete events in physical reality are unidirectional, the time 
order within the numerical aspect could be experienced both in the positive and 
the negative directions. 
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(Planck, 1973:55). The effect was that physicists had to 
acknowledge that physical time is irreversible. This irreversibility is 
manifested in the a-symmetrical relation of causality, for it stands to 
reason that the cause precedes the effect. Kant already realised that 
causality is not identical to succession, because although day and 
night (and: night and day) are succeeding each other, it is incorrect 
to say that either one is the cause of the other one. 
In a different context Janich draws a clear distinction between 
phoronomic and dynamic statements.7 He states that the scope of 
the strict distinction between phoronomic (subsequently called 
kinematic) and dynamic arguments could be explained in terms of 
an example. Modern physics has to employ a dynamic interpretation 
of the statement that a body can alter its speed continuously only. 
Given certain conditions, a body can never accelerate in a 
discontinuous way, that is to say, it cannot change its speed through 
an infinitely large acceleration, because that will require an infinite 
force.8
Since the discovery of radio-activity it turned out that within micro-
structures themselves there are irreversible processes present 
proceeding spontaneously in one direction only. In addition, this 
state of affairs, straightaway, confirms the irreducibility of the 
physical aspect to the kinematical aspect (with its reversible time 
order). It is therefore incorrect to say that “change” is the only 
“constant.” 
                                          
7 The early 19th century German philosopher, Von Baader, already employed a 
distinction between the mechanical and dynamical (see Von Baader, 1851:52 ff. 
– an exposition forming part of a contribution to a dynamic philosophy as 
opposed to a mechanical one: “Beiträge zur dynamischen Philosophie im 
Gegensatze zu der mechanischen”). 
8 “Die Tragweite einer strengen Unterscheidung phoronomischer (im folgenden 
kinematisch genannt) und dynamischer Argumente möchte ich an einem 
Beispiel erläutern, das ... aus der Protophysik stammt. Die Aussage ‘ein Körper 
kann seine Geschwindigkeit nur stetig ändern’ kann von der modernen Physik 
nur dynamisch verstanden werden. Geschwindigkeitsänderungen sind Besch-
leunigung, d.h. als Zweite Ableitung des Weges nach der Zeit definiert. Zeit wird 
von der Physik als ein Parameter behandelt, an dessen Erzeugung durch eine 
Parametermaschine (‘Uhr’) de facto bestimmte Homogenitätserwartungen 
geknüpft sind ... Bezogen auf dem Gang einer angeblich so ausgewählten 
Parametermaschine kann ein Körper seine Geschwindigkeit deshalb nich 
unstetig, d.h. mit unendlich große Beschleunigung ändern, weil dazu eine 
unendlich große Kraft erförderlich wäre” (Janich, 1975:68-69). 
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Already in his Isagogè Philosophiae (1930) the Dutch philosopher, 
Vollenhoven, distinguished between the mechanical and the 
physical aspects. However, in the edition of 1936 this distinction no 
longer appears. His colleaugue, Dooyeweerd, on the contrary, 
initially maintained the order numerical, spatial, physical – thus 
identifying the kinematical aspect with the physical aspect. Round 
about 1950 he realised that this distinction is necessary to account 
for the fact that kinematics (phoronomy) can define an uniform 
motion without any reference to a causing force (compare Galileo’s 
law of inertia).9 That physical laws pre-suppose the meaning of the 
kinematic aspect, could be demonstrated with reference to the first 
main law of thermodynamics, currently known as the law of the 
conservation of energy. Already in 1847, at the youthful age of 26, 
Helmholtz presented a formulation of this first main law of physics to 
the Physics Society of Berlin. He began by pointing out that nobody 
had succeeded in building a successful perpetual motion machine. 
This was a logical consequence of the indestructibility of energy. Up 
to this day physicists recognise this law as the law of energy 
conservation, which means that energy cannot be created or 
destroyed. What is at stake here is the constancy of energy. But the 
nature of constancy is precisely what Einstein employed in his 
special theory of relativity. One can indeed say that the crux of 
Einstein’s theory of relativity is to be found in the nature of the 
(kinematic) order of constancy, which it presupposes.10
Bryon and Spielberg correctly emphasise that Einstein’s theory 
concerns “invariance” – i.e. constancy – but unfortunately they 
confused it with the terms absolute and unchanging: 
Indeed, Einstein originally developed his theory in order to find 
those things that are invariant (absolute and unchanging) rather 
than the relative. He was concerned with things that are universal 
and the same from all points of view (Bryon & Spielberg, 1987:6). 
The term unchanging is simply the denial (negation) of change – a 
physical term.11 The physical aspect must not only be distinguished 
                                          
9 See Dooyeweerd (1997-II:99). In Strauss (2003a) an account of the ontic status 
of the various modal aspects of reality is found, with special reference to the 
numerical and spatial aspects. 
10 Both Einstein and Planck criticised the mechanistic main tendency of classical 
(Newtonian) physics (see Einstein, 1959:42 and Planck, 1973:65). 
11 The term absolute cannot really be applied to anything in creation, that is, not if 
one wants to avoid the idolisation/absolutisation of created reality. 
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from its foundational kinematic aspect, since there is also an 
indissoluble coherence between these two aspects. For this reason 
one shall find within the physical aspect a structural moment which 
reminds of the foundational meaning of the kinematic aspect. 
Constancy appears in the physical aspect as a structural reminder of 
the meaning of motion. In philosophical terms one may say that one 
finds an analogy of the kinematic aspect at the law side of the 
physical aspect (see Strauss, 2000). 
A formulation of the first main law of thermodynamics, which intends 
to be true to reality, would therefore have to refer to energy 
constancy. Strictly speaking, the use of the term conservation is 
inadequate, since the activity of retention itself requires an input of 
energy – as in the case of thermodynamic “open systems” (or 
“steady states”). The law of energy constancy illustrates not only the 
distinct uniqueness of the kinematic and physical aspects, but, while 
taking into account the distinction between law side and factual side, 
also the indissoluble coherence between them: without the 
foundational position of the kinematic aspect in the order of the 
various cosmic aspects, we would have no grounds for discerning 
an analogy of the aspect of movement within the physical aspect, 
that is, the analogy of energy constancy. The distinctness and 
mutual coherence of constancy and change renders the statement 
that change is the only constant meaningless. 
5. Modes of explanation making identity understand-
able 
The idea of an entity transcends any particular mode of explanation 
through which knowledge of entities is obtainable. One can explore 
different modes of explanation to demonstrate this perspective. But 
whenever any specific mode of explanation is used, two things 
ought to be kept in mind. Firstly, approaching an entity from one 
functional (aspectual) perspective only can never exhaust the full, 
many-sided existence of such an entity. Secondly, terms from any 
specific mode (aspect/function/facet) of reality could be used in a 
way stretching beyond the limits of the mode under consideration – 
in which case it could be used in a concept-transcending way to 
refer to the entire existence of an entity. 
When one speaks about the unity of an entity, the fact that it is one, 
a straight-forward appeal is made to the quantitative function of such 
an entity (in which case the numerical terms one and unity are used 
conceptually, i.e. they are employed to refer to the way in which an 
entity functions within the arithmetical aspect). The philosophical 
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legacy of the West also explored the numerical intuition, by using it 
to refer to more than the mere quantitative aspect of an entity. The 
acknowledgement of the individuality and uniqueness of an entity is 
quantitatively conditioned in that it is distinct. This awareness of the 
individuality of an entity (its being distinct) does not merely capture 
the numerical qualities of an entity, since it at once alludes to all 
other features of it as well. In other words, functional terms, such as 
those having their seat within the quantitative mode of reality, can be 
used to refer to the way in which an entity functions within the 
boundaries of a specific aspect (the conceptual use of the terms one 
and unity), or the numerical intuition can be stretched in concept-
transcending ways to refer to the total existence of an entity in terms 
of the idea of its uniqueness or individuality. 
Therefore, when an entity is seen as an individual entity, i.e., as 
being distinct from other entities, the (co-conditioning) role of the 
quantitative mode is at stake. Yet this fact does not justify the 
elevation of number to become the “principle of individuation”, as it 
is found in Aristotle, who connected the category of quantity with 
matter: “But all things that are many in number have matter” 
(Aristotle, 2001: Metaph., 1074a:33-34). 
In addition to the just mentioned numerical mode of explanation, the 
description of an entity may explore the spatial mode, by adding a 
different specification, for instance when an entity is designated as 
an individual whole (totality). It is only when one explores the points 
of entry offered by the kinematical and physical aspects of reality, 
that one is capable of articulating a well founded intuition of identity. 
Then one can add further specifications in saying that an entity is an 
enduring individual whole, in spite of any changes to which it may be 
subjected. The term identity acquires a concept-transcending 
meaning in the sense that it stretches the original kinematical 
meaning of movement beyond its modal (aspectual) limits, to refer to 
the entity in the totality of its persistence (enduring existence). This 
idea of identity presupposes the core kinematical meaning of a 
uniform motion, but it cannot be reduced to it. 
In general one can say that terms residing within a particular modal 
aspect may therefore be applied in a twofold sense: either as 
referring to phenomena functioning within the aspect concerned, or 
terms like these may be employed in such a way that they stand in 
the service of an understanding transcending the limited context of a 
specific mode of explanation. When the awareness of uniform 
motion is applied to the description of an uniformly moving body in a 
purely (abstract) kinematic sense, one may say that such a term is 
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used in a conceptual way. However, the moment one expands the 
scope and uses the term constancy in order to refer to the identity of 
an entity over time in spite of changes it may experience, then the 
intuition of constancy is expanded in a concept-transcending way 
that is manifest in speaking about the identity of such an entity. 
The phrase concept-transcending knowledge can be designated as 
idea-knowledge, where it is assumed that a form of thought is 
needed in order to capture that kind of knowledge transcending the 
limits of concept formation.12 In general therefore our talking about 
the identity of things rests upon the basis of a concept-transcending 
idea of the transmodal reality of entities.13 It entails that entities 
belong to a distinct dimension of reality intimately cohering with 
another dimension of reality, namely that of modal functions 
(aspects). We only have access to entities because these aspects 
not only serve as modes of being and modes of explanation, but 
also as experiential points of entry to entities. 
Lowe is justified in distinguishing between identity and unity: “A 
principle of individuation, we might say, is not so much a criterion of 
identity as a principle of unity” (Lowe, 1998:33). Instead of exploring 
the kinematical meaning of uniform motion and its expansion to the 
idea of the identity of an entity, Lowe reverts to the logical-
mathematical criterion of identity advanced by Frege (see Lowe, 
1998:41).14 Our basic concern is with the ontic identity of entities15 
                                          
12 Nicolai Hartmann therefore aptly explained Kant’s notion of the ideas of reason 
in a similar fashion. The thought-form required to think of an unknowable “thing-
in-itself” (“Ding an sich”) is what a “Grenzbegriff” intends to capture (see 
Strauss, 2003b:254, particularly also note 17 about the translational equivalent 
of Grenzbegriff as concept-transcending knowledge). It should be noted that 
conceptual knowledge is constituted by universality, whereas idea-knowledge 
approximates what is unique, individual and contingent. 
13 Dooyeweerd writes: “The transcendental Idea of the individual whole precedes 
the theoretical analysis of its modal functions. It is its pre-suposition, its 
cosmological a-priori” (Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:65). 
14 Frege actually contemplates the context of logical and symbolical objectification 
– see Frege 1987:94 ff. (original text 62 ff.). Van Ingwagen also does not 
explore the twofold use of modal terms in combination with the basic ontic reality 
of endurance over time (see Van Ingwagen, 2001:95 ff.). Authors from the 
tradition of analytic philosophy tend to revert to logic as a basic orientation for 
considering the issue of identity without realising that the ontic conditions for 
identity precedes the meaning of logical analysis. This issue requires the special 
attention of a different article. 
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– mindful of the Quinian slogan mentioned by Schulte: “No entity 
without identity” (Schulte, 1987:149). 
One is now in a position to understand why Von Kibèd got stuck in a 
static logic of identity. It is because he disregarded the kinematic 
and physical points of entry to entitary reality. In other words, he did 
not acknowledge the uniqueness and coherence between constancy 
and dynamics.16 A fruitful ontology requires an articulated 
awareness of the multiple modal aspects of reality – such as it is 
found in the philosophical legacy of Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven.17
6. Mechanistic biology and the identity of living entities 
The immense successes of organic chemistry and biochemistry in 
unravelling the intricate physico-chemical functioning of living 
entities tempt modern biologists, who are inclined to a physicalistic 
approach, to over-accentuate the dynamic flow of the physical-
chemical constituents of living entities. Just consider the fact that all 
the atoms of our body, even of our bones, are exchanged at least 
once every seven years; all the atoms in our face are renewed every 
six months; all our red blood cells every four months; and 98% of the 
protein in the brain in less than a month. Add to this that our white 
blood cells are replaced every ten days and one-thirteenth of all our 
tissue proteins are renewed every 24 hours,18 then one may 
justifiably ask the question: what guarantees the identity of a living 
entity if all the candidates are caught up in a constant flux? 
From a purely mechanistic or physicalistic point of view, a living 
thing is explicable in physical terms only. Then it must display a 
physico-chemical identity constituted by its atoms, molecules and 
                                                                                                                           
15 Frege certainly employs an appropriate expression when he speaks about 
“Identitätsurteile”/“identity propositions” (Frege, 2001:15). While he immediately 
relates such propositions to the logical principle of identity, our argument opts to 
account for the given ontic reality of enduring entities. 
16 Once more one has to point out that Einstein did not develop a theory of 
relativity, but rather a theory of constancy. 
17 Carnap proceeds from a fairly simplistic and reduced view when he discusses 
five basic relations as categories: “identity, similarity, intensity, time, and space” 
(Carnap, 1967:135). With these terms Carnap intends the numerical (identity), 
the spatial (similarity, space), the kinematical (time) and the physical (intensity). 
18 See Jones (1998:40). 
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macro-molecules. The problem, however, is that all these con-
stituents are constantly changing! Which of these physico-chemical 
components could then constitute this supposedly purely physico-
chemical identity of living things? Will it be those atoms, molecules, 
and macro-molecules currently present within it, those present years 
ago, or those that will be present a few years hence? 
When living things are physicalistically reduced to their material 
constituents, their biotical identity is necessarily lost – since the 
supposed elements of identity continually vary.19
Yet, once the unique biotical function of living things is taken into 
account, it is even possible to claim that a living thing, considered in 
terms of the biotic mode of explanation, is in a stable state (referred 
to as health), while at the same time the claim can be made – 
without any contradiction – that, considered in terms of a physico-
chemical mode of explanation (with a view to the flowing equilibrium 
of its physical-chemical constituents), it exists in an unstable state.20 
If the physical-chemical substratum of living things approaches a 
state of higher statistical probability, biotical instability increases as a 
sign of the final process of dying.21
From the preceding considerations, important consequences follow:  
• Whenever an idea of identity is formulated, the decisive clue is 
always given in the mode of explanation involved. For example, 
compared to the physical identity of material entities, living 
entities display a biotical identity. 
• Furthermore, whenever identity is the theme, at least an implicit 
awareness of the foundational relationship between constancy 
and dynamics is entailed. 
                                          
19 Plato discusses the example of a wooden ship of which all the constitutive parts 
are replaced on sea (Plato, 1963: Phaido, 58; see the discussion of Van 
Woudenberg, 2000:28). 
20 We should remember that Von Bertalanffy (on the basis of his idea of the 
dynamic equilibrium – Fliessgleichgewicht) generalised the second main law of 
thermodynamics to open systems (see Strauss, 2002b). 
21 Heraclitus must have understood something of open systems with his idea of 
flux, because his thought exhibits an awareness of the reciprocity between 
persistence and change (see Diels & Kranz, 1959/1960: B Fr.90). 
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• Finally, since an entity is more than the sum of its different modes 
of explanation, no single (entitary) identity-claim can exhaust the 
uniqueness of any entity. 
Sometimes a distinction is made between living and non-living 
entities: the first category applies to entities that retain their identity 
in spite of changes, whereas the second category refers to material 
things. Van Woudenberg remarks that the latter groups of entities 
can only be maintained through external intervention. It is clear that 
he did not realise that what Von Bertalanffy designated as a flowing 
equilibrium (Fliessgleichgewicht) – exemplified in a fire or glacier – 
does not require external maintenance (such as in the case of 
Plato’s ship). Consequently, there ought to be no objection to speak 
about the identity of physical entities as well. Endurance over a 
period of time may rather be questioned in terms of the “principle of 
the inderscernability of identicals” of Leibniz. This entailes that only 
when we restrict ourselves to a specific moment in time it is possible 
to affirm the identity of entities. However, as Van Woundenberg 
(2000:43) remarks, the idea of temporal parts does not side-step the 
awareness of identity over time, but presupposes it.22
7. The problem of the mind-brain identity 
In spite of the fascinating detail brought to light by contemporary 
cognitive science, it must be clear that within this field one can easily 
end up with different modes of explanation, incorrectly appreciated 
as conflicting modes of explanation. An inclination towards the 
supposedly decisive biotical structure of the brain (as an organ) 
might have lost sight of other equally important modes of 
explanation. This is explored in approaches primarily interested in 
sensitive phenomena, in empirical detail about logical reasoning, 
about techno-formative skills (for instance in tool-making), in the 
uniquely human linguistic abilities, and so on.  
If the distinction between modal function and (transmodal) entity is 
neglected, the fallacy of reification becomes actual. The concrete 
many-sidedness of human subjectivity and human agency 
transcends any mode of explanation because, as we have pointed 
out above, no single aspect exhaust human functioning. Therefore, if 
the brain is explained in terms of a mode different from the biotical, 
then the supposed mind-brain identity claim would be highly 
problematic (and recognised as reductionistic). Even the materialist 
                                          
22 See in this connection also Fine (2003). 
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(physicalist) claim that the brain is just a complex configuration of 
atoms, molecules and macromolecules, do not side-step the “mode-
of-explanation-transcending” entitary dimension of reality. The 
enduring identity of physically qualified entities is just as much a 
mystery (from the perspective of one functional explanation) as is 
the case with biotical or sensitively characterised entities. Any 
attempt to reduce the sensitive or biotic dimensions to the physical 
therefore does not give one a decisive (conceptual) understanding 
of the “what-ness” of material entities. For that reason Stegmüller is 
certainly justified, when he states that even for the science of the 
20th century, the concept of matter is one of the most difficult and 
most mysterious concepts whatsoever.23
Glas also proceeds from the idea of modal functions as modes of 
explanation, when he remarks that he employs the term level with 
reference to “the qualitative distinctiveness between modes of 
reality” and to the distinctiveness of modes and entities: “When the 
modal analysis of an aspect of reality is fundamental in the process 
of abstraction, then the entitary reformulation of this modal (or 
functional) point of view may become a first step into the direction of 
reification and undue substantializing” (Glas, 2002:154). In response 
to the approaches of Churchland and other neuroscientists, he 
highlights the shortcomings both of dualist and monist accounts: 
Psychophysical dualism and dualist interactionism may be seen as 
a result of the unjustified belief in the independent existence of 
mind and of body as (quasi-) substances. The modal aspect – 
mental functioning as a mode of functioning that qualitatively 
differs from biological functioning – is substantialized and changed 
into a mental substance or a mental entity called ‘The Mind’. 
Psychophysical identity theories, on the other hand, run the risk of 
being transformed into one or another form of monism. This occurs 
when the nature of the ‘common ground’ of different forms of 
functioning is defined in terms of one particular scientific discipline, 
such as biology (Glas, 2002:164). 
Repko provides a penetrating analysis of various contemporary 
reductionist and antireductionist paradigms in the philosophy of 
mind.24
                                          
23 “Und daß auf der anderen Seite ausgerechnet der Materiebegriff der 
schwierigste, unbewältigste und rätselhafteste Begriff überhaupt für die 
Wissenschaft dieses Jahrhunderts blieb” (Stegmüller, 1987:90). 
24 He discusses the contributions of Dennett, Churchland, Searle and McGinn (see 
Repko, 2002). 
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8. Societal identities 
The philosophy of mind and social philosophy also struggled 
extensively with issues of personal identity (traditionally: the 
supposed relationship between body and soul and more recently, 
the just mentioned question regarding the identity of mind and brain) 
and with the complex relationships between the “individual” and 
“society” (collective identity). Am I in the first place someone with an 
ethnic identity (such as an Englishman, Zulu, Afrikaner or Sotho) 
and only in the second instance partaking in a specific political 
identity (such as being a South African, American, etcetera)? 
The basic and important perspective in this context is that no single 
societal identity – however, much is considered to be a “social 
construction” – can escape both from fundamental ontic modes of 
explanation co-conditioning human society (such as the lingual,25 
the economic, the social, the aesthetic, the jural and the moral) and 
the various possible identities human beings can construe (and 
assume) in the process of, what Simmel calls, sociation. Simmel 
holds that a number of individuals are only transformed from a 
spatial aggregate or a temporal sequence into a society when 
(through sociation) these individuals exercise a mutual influence 
upon each other: “If, therefore, there is to be a science whose 
subject matter is society and nothing else, it must exclusively 
investigate these interactions, these kinds and forms of sociation” 
(see Levine, 1971:24-25).26
Therefore, one should also realise that the existence of no single 
human being is ever exhaustively encompassed by participating in 
                                          
25 It should be noted that every mode of explanation has an universal scope in the 
sense that whatever there is in principle, has a function in every ontic mode of 
reality. Another way to refer to this state of affairs, is to speak about the modal 
universality of different aspects. This may provide an(other) interpretation of 
Derrida’s statement that there is nothing outside the text different from his own 
eventual explanation. In terms of the modal universality of the sign mode, one 
can say that whatever there is within reality, will always also function within this 
aspect – suggesting that there is indeed nothing outside the “text”, i.e., not 
functioning within the “text” or sign mode. Derrida eventually said that “[t]he 
phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly 
understood, of deconstruction (‘there is nothing outside the text’ [il n’y a pas de 
hors-texte]), means nothing else: there is nothing outside context” (Derrida, 
1988:136). In terms of our suggestion: there is no entitary existence outside the 
context of (multiple) modal universality. 
26 According to Simmel, however, the assumed reality of a supra-individual society 
is a fatal reification of a mere abstraction (cf. Ziegenfuss, 1956:14). 
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any single social collectivity.27 Consequently, the socially 
differentiated roles played by human beings within multiple societal 
collectivities, are always merely partial, entailing that any given 
person is always at once, i.e., simultaneously, participating in 
various social entities.28
This means that at once a person may be a father, citizen, club 
member, and so on, participating in these distinct social identities, 
without fully being absorbed by any one of them. The mystery of the 
human being certainly coheres with the fact that no single 
differentiated social identity can fully and exhaustively encompass 
the nature of being human.29
9. Concluding remark 
The preceding discussion was mainly focused on the difference 
between an entity and the diverse modal aspects in which such an 
entity functions. The argument rests upon the assumption that an 
entity is transmodal in nature. The co-conditional role of functional 
aspects as modes of explanation, supported our argument that 
change can only be established on the basis of constancy. Yet, the 
step from constancy to an awareness of identity needed a further 
elaboration – given in our brief account of the difference between a 
conceptual and a concept-transcending use of modal terms. 
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